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III.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case
This case arises out of the valuation of community property in the divorce of Susan

Christine Parnell f/k/a Susan Christine Vierstra ("Susan") and Michael George Vierstra
("Michael," and collectively with Susan, the "Vierstras"). Susan timely appealed to the District
Court from the Magistrate's Amended Judgment and Decree ofDivorce (the "Amended
Judgment") and from the Magistrate's Order re: Post Trial Motions, contending that the
Magistrate abused its discretion by factoring $1,006,000 of potential future tax into its valuation
of the Vierstra dairy when such potential future tax was neither immediate nor specific.
Susan further contended that the Magistrate erred when it failed to enforce the property
division ordered by the Judgment and Decree ofDivorce (the "Judgment") and the Amended
Judgment by adjusting its valuation of the Vierstra dairy when the 2009 income taxes turned out

to be less than one-tenth of the $1,006,000 anticipated by the Original and Amended Judgments.
As a result of the Magistrate's errors, Susan has been deprived of approximately $460,000 of
community assets, while affording a windfall to Michael in that same amount.
B.

Course of Proceedings
Susan filed a Complaint/or Divorce on September 19,2008. A trial occurred on October

13-14,2009 and on November 19,20 and 24,2009. One ofthe key issues in the divorce
involved the valuation of the Vierstra dairy. Following the trial, the Magistrate entered its
Memorandum Decision on January 7, 2010 followed by the Judgment on January 25,2010,

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

-5-

which contemplated an award of the dairy to one of the parties and provided for an equalization
payment to the other. The Magistrate entered an Amended Judgment and Decree ofDivorce on
April 29, 2010.
Both parties filed various post-trial motions. On February 8,2010, the fourteenth (14th)
day following the entry of the Judgment, Susan timely filed an Objection to the Form of the
Judgment and Decree ofDivorce ("Plaintiff's Objection"), which was later supported by a
Memorandum in Support ofPlaintiffs Objection to the Form of the Judgment and Decree of
Divorce ("Memorandum in Support"), filed March 25,2010. A contested hearing was held on

the Plaintiff's Objection on April 27, 2010, after which the Amended Judgment was entered on
April 29, 2010 in conformity with the changes ordered by the Court after hearing arguments by
both parties.
While the Plaintiff's Objection was pending, Susan filed her Motion to Petition the Court
to Address the Adjustments ("Motion to Adjust") on April 23, 2010 (R. at 921) and supporting

affidavit. (R. at 911). The Motion to Adjust sought to enforce the automatic adjustment to the
equalization payment due to her to reflect the actual 2009 tax amount as ordered by the Original
and Amended Judgments. Instead of enforcing its previous judgments and automatically
adjusting the valuation of the Vierstra Dairy, the Magistrate re-opened the issue and received
additional testimony on the subject at the hearing on May 12,2010, over Susan's objection. In
the Order re: Post Trial Motions of May 18,2010 (R. at 1000), the Magistrate now held that
some tax would come due over the next several years, although it was without proof ofthe
$1,006,000 tax liability amount. The effect of this order was to reverse and modify the
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Magistrate's previous finding and order which had required automatic adjustment of the
valuation of the Vierstra Dairy if the 2009 taxes turned out to be any different than $1,006,000.
Susan timely filed her Notice ofAppeal from the Amended Judgment and Order Re: Post

Trial Motions on June 10,2010. Oral argument for Susan's appeal was held on January 21,
2011. On February 4,2011, the District Court entered sua sponte its Order for Supplemental

Briefing Regarding District Court's Jurisdiction to Consider Appeal ("Order for Supplemental
Briefing"). The Order for Supplemental Briefing contained preliminary observations suggesting
that (1) the tax issue did not appear to be timely appealed because that holding was not altered by
the Amended Judgment; and (2) the Magistrate did not appear to have jurisdiction to hold the
May 12,2010 hearing which resulted in the Order Re: Post Trial Motions, thereby divesting
jurisdiction from the district court to consider the conclusions therein.
After receiving additional briefing on those issues, the District Court entered its

Memorandum Opinion on Appeal on June 9, 2011 concluding that it lacked jurisdiction to
consider Susan's appeal from the Amended Judgment regarding the tax issues arising in the
Magistrate's valuation of the Vierstra Dairy. The Memorandum Opinion on Appeal also
concluded that the District Court had jurisdiction to consider Susan's appeal from the Order Re:

Post Trial Motions, but that the Magistrate lacked jurisdiction to modifY the Judgment regarding
the valuation of the Vierstra Dairy. Therefore, the District Court concluded that the Magistrate
could not consider Susan's Motion to Adjust and, accordingly, vacated paragraph 4 ofthe Order

Re: Post Trial Motions which had denied Susan's motion to enforce the automatic adjustment.
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On June 28,2011, Susan filed a Motion for Clarification seeking guidance on the
practical effect of the District Court's Memorandum Opinion on Appeal, which offered no
instruction for the parties or the Magistrate going forward. The Memorandum Opinion on

Appeal simply vacated the Magistrate's denial of Susan's Motion to Adjust. Following a hearing
on the matter on July 11,2011, the District Court took the matter under advisement. On July 13,
2011, the District Court entered its Order Denying Motionfor Clarification by which the District
Court refused to consider Susan's motion, holding that it was without jurisdiction to do so.
Susan timely filed a notice of appeal to this Court on July 21, 2011.
Susan's notice of appeal sought review ofthe District Court's dismissal of her issues on
appeal as well as her Motion for Clarification. Susan additionally sought review by this Court of
the original issues raised on appeal concerning (1) the inclusion of future tax consequences in the
Magistrate's valuation of the Vierstra Dairy and (2) the Magistrate's denial of Susan's Motion to

Adjust seeking enforcement of the Judgment and Amended Judgment. By order dated November
2,2011, this Court granted Michael's motion to dismiss these two issues as they were not
directly addressed at length in the District Court's Memorandum on Appeal. Additionally, Susan
no longer seeks relief from the District Court's denial of her Motion for Clarification.
Accordingly, those issues are not addressed herein, except as they may relate to Susan's
remaining issues on appeal.

c.

Statement of Facts
Susan and Michael were married on July 31, 1988. (Tr. 11120/09 Vol. III P. 182 L. 1-3).

Susan filed for divorce on September 19,2008. The Vierstra dairy has been in operation for over
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twenty years and throughout the marriage. In 1987, before the parties' marriage, Michael
declared bankruptcy (Tr. 11124/09 Vol. I P. 89 L. 14-15). At the time oftheir marriage, Susan
invested her separate funds into the dairy and Susan's father also helped the couple finance and
expand the dairy. (Tr. 11/20109 Vol. II P. 131 L. 19-24); Tr. 11124/09 Vol. 1. P. 82 L. 15-25).
Throughout the dairy's entire existence, Susan and Michael worked on the dairy and built it from
the ground up. By the time that divorce proceedings were brought, the parties had amassed a
dairy, feed lot and farmland that were all owned by the parties.
The Vierstras used the cash method of reporting income and expenses to the I.R.S. (Tr.
10114/09 Vol. II P. 143 L. 16-17). The cash method of accounting allowed them to recognize

revenue on their tax return when they actually received it and deduct expenses when paid, as
opposed to when the income was earned or the expenses were incurred. (Tr. 10114/09 Vol. II P.
143 L. 19-21). In this manner, the Vierstras had the ability to control their tax liability, and
whomever was awarded the dairy would also have the ability to "knock down their tax" by
"simply getting prepaid inventory." (Tr. 10114/09 Vol. II P. 169 L. 16-P. 170 L. 1; Tr. 10114/09
Vol. II P. 169 L. 8-20).
At trial in the Fall of2009, Michael presented expert testimony from Buckner Harris
("Harris") that approximately $1,006,000 in potential tax liability should be included in the
valuation of the Vierstra dairy. (Tr. 11120/09 Vol. I P. 58 L. 16-18). Specifically, Michael
testified that ifhe did not buy feed in the current year to offset the dairy's income, he would have
a tremendous tax consequence. (Tr. 11/20109 Vol. III P. 231 L. 8-9).
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After the trial concluded in the Fall of2009, the Magistrate found that "more likely than
not, the Vierstra dairy will incur a tax consequence for the year 2009" and that "the tax
consequence to be those shown in Exhibit 801A [$1,006,000]." (Memorandum Decision, at 17,
19, R. at 561,563). However, the Magistrate instructed that "[i]fno tax consequence occurs, or
ifthe tax consequence is different from that shown [by Michael's exhibit], the parties shall adjust
the valuations and equalizations accordingly." (Memorandum Decision, at 19, R. at 563)
(emphasis added). The Magistrate reiterated these same findings and instructions in its Amended
Judgment and Decree ofDivorce which were prepared by Defendant's counsel. (Amended
Judgment, at 6 ~ 9, R. at 962).

Rather than the approximately $1,006,000 tax liability presented at trial in the fall of
2009, the actual 2009 taxes turned out to be approximately $85,000. (Tr. 05/12110 Vol. I P. 64
L. 23-P. 65 L. 6).1 Prior to that time, neither Susan nor Michael knew what the exact tax liability

would be for 2009-and, by extension, the exact valuation of the Vierstra Dairy-therefore,
there was nothing to appeal or adjust in accordance with the Amended Judgment. After the
actual amount became known and Michael refused to adjust the equalization payment due to
Susan according to the actual tax liability for 2009 as ordered by the Judgment and Amended
Judgment, Susan filed the Motion to Adjust. Susan's Motion to Adjust sought to enforce the

automatic adjustment contained in the Magistrate's prior orders. Such adjustment was necessary
because inclusion of the $1,006,000 in income tax liability (instead of the actual amount of
approximately $85,000) decreased the dairy's value by a corresponding amount, meaning the
I The transcripts from the hearing on post-trial motions do not provide line numbers. For the Court's ease of
reference, line numbers have been manually counted and provided for the Court's review.
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equalization payment due to Susan was significantly less than the equalization payment would
have been had the Magistrate used the actual 2009 income tax liability in its calculations.
At the conclusion of the hearing on post-trial motions, the Magistrate made limited oral
findings on the potential tax liability. (Tr. 05/12/1 0 Vol. II P. 196 L. 6). In connection with its
ruling, the Magistrate expressed understandable concern that it did not want to run the risk of
disturbing Michael's financing and his corresponding equalization payment to Susan out of the
proceeds of such financing:
I've never thought, to be honest with you, that either party would be able to
finance this ... , It turns out that Mike Vierstra does have a chance to finance this.
The key ruling that I make today will determine, I suppose, whether that happens
or not. ...
(Tr. 05/12/10 Vol. lIP. 196 L. 21-25). The Magistrate then found that it did not believe that
either value provided by the two parties was realistic:
Ijust don't [sic] that this thing actually has a value of- of the One Million, so it is
the Eighty Thousand or is it the One Million, because I have to pick one of the
two and I honestly don't believe that either one of those numbers is what should
be ordered by the Court, but that's the evidence I have been given.
(Tr. 05/12/10 Vol. II P. 197 L. 6-9) (emphasis added). The Magistrate then selected Michael's
characterization of the tax liability in order to protect the pending financing and invited the
parties to seek review of his decision by the appellate courts (at which time the financing would
be complete):
I also think the parties are better protected by my ruling that way. . .. I find that
by the preponderance of the evidence, it's the One Million Dollars. I would also
say this. By the choice I've made today, if I'm wrong on [sic1 an appellate court
will tell me and there will be Four Hundred Thousand Dollars more ordered down
the road to be paid to Susan. IfI'm right, then I made the right decision today and

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

- 11 -

any appeals was [sic] wasted time. . .. But the other thing that would happen is
that if we sell it in today's market, I'm not too sure that either of these two people
would serve [sic] by it.
(Tr. 05112110 Vol. lIP. 197 L. 10-18) (emphasis added).
The Magistrate issued its Order re: Post Trial Motions on May 18,2010, which refused
to enforce the automatic adjustment, thereby altering its previous orders contained in the

Judgment and Amended Judgment. The Magistrate acknowledged that to do otherwise would
cause Michael's financing to fall through and that it would be "unwise for the Court to cause the
sale of the dairy because it would result in less money paid to both parties." (Order re: Post

Trial Motions, at 4 ~ 4, R. at 1003-04). Following the Magistrate's Order re: Post Trial
Motions, Michael's financing of the dairy closed on May 27,2010, at which time Michael made
an equalization payment to Susan of approximately $380,000, which amount was approximately
$460,000 less than he would have been required to pay had the Magistrate enforced its prior
orders by implementing the automatic adjustment.
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IV.
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
Whether the District Court erred by dismissing Susan's appeal from the Order Re: Post Trial
Motions entered by the Magistrate Court on May 18,2010 for lack of jurisdiction?
Whether the District Court erred by dismissing the appeal from the Amended Judgment entered
on April 29, 2010 for lack of jurisdiction?
Susan is entitled to costs and attorney's fees on appeal pursuant to Idaho law, including LA.R.
40, LA.R. 41 and I.C. § 12-121.
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v.
ARGUMENT
A.

Standard of Review
When reviewing a decision of the district court acting in its appellate capacity, this Court

directly reviews the district court's decision. Mackowiak v. Harris, 146 Idaho 864, 865,204
P .3d 504, 505 (2009). If substantial and competent evidence supports the magistrate's findings
offact, the magistrate's conclusions of law follow from those findings, and the district court
affirms the magistrate, this Court affirms the district court's decision as a matter of procedure.
Losser v. Bradstreet, 145 Idaho 670, 672, 183 P.3d 758, 760 (2008). A question of jurisdiction is
fundamental and should be addressed prior to considering the merits of an appeal. Ratkowski v.
Ratkowski, 115 Idaho 692, 693, 769 P.2d 569, 570 (1989).
A trial court's disposition of community property is reviewed for an abuse of discretion.
Chandler v. Chandler, 136 Idaho 246, 249, 32 P.3d 140, 143 (2001). When a trial court's
discretionary decision is reviewed on appeal, the appellate court conducts a multi-tiered inquiry
to determine: (1) whether the lower court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2)
whether the lower court acted within the boundaries of such discretion and consistently with any
legal standards applicable to the specific choices before it; and (3) whether the court reached its
decision by an exercise of reason. Sun Valley Shopping Ctr., Inc. v. Idaho Power Co., 119 Idaho
87,94,803 P.2d 993,1000 (1991).

In evaluating a Magistrate's exercise of discretion, an

appellate court "examine [s] the magistrate record to determine whether there is substantial and
competent evidence to support the magistrate's findings of fact and whether the magistrate's
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conclusions oflaw follow from those findings." Crump v. Bromley, 148 Idaho 172, 173,219
P .3d 1188, 1189 (2009).
B.

Whether the District Court erred by dismissing Susan's appeal from the Order Re:
Post Trial Motions entered by the Magistrate Court on May 18, 2010 for lack of
jurisdiction?

One of the issues presented to the District Court concerned whether the Magistrate erred
by failing to enforce the Judgment and Amended Judgment as written by automatically adjusting
the valuation of the Vierstra Dairy based on the actual 2009 tax figures. Both the Judgment and
Amended Judgment contain the following language:

The court finds the tax consequence to be incurred by Vierstra Dairy in 2009 is as
shown on Exhibit 801(a) [$1,006,000]. The court finds that it is more likely than
not that Vierstra Dairy will incur the tax consequence. The party who receives
the dairy will timely pay said taxes to the State ofIdaho and the Internal Revenue
Service. If no tax consequence occurs, or if the tax consequence is different from
that shown in Exhibit 801(a), the parties shall adjust the valuations and
equalizations accordingly. If necessary, the parties can petition the court to
address the adjustments. The court orders the parties to timely file tax returns and
other filings concerning the Vierstra Dairy.
(Judgment, at 6 ~ 9, R. at 602; Amended Judgment, at 6 ~ 9, R. at 962) (emphasis added). The

actual tax liability for 2009 was only $85,172, not $1,006,000. Therefore, Susan attempted to
enforce that provision in accordance with its terms. Michael refused to adjust the equalization
payment on his own initiative and pay the actual amount due to Susan. Subsequently, Susan's
Motion to Adjust, which sought to judicially enforce the terms of the Judgment and Amended
Judgment, was denied by the Order Re: Post Trial Motions.

Susan timely appealed this issue to the District Court which dismissed on jurisdictional
grounds. The District Court acknowledged that it had jurisdiction to consider Susan's appeal of
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this issue, but nevertheless dismissed Susan's appeal holding that the Magistrate "lacked
jurisdiction to modify the tax liability and valuation of the Vierstra Dairy." (Memorandum
Opinion on Appeal, at 9, R. at 1244). This holding was erroneous.
1.

Susan's Motion to Adjust sought enforcement of the Judgment and Amended
Judgment, not modification.
The District Court misconstrued the nature of Susan's Motion to Adjust as well as the

Magistrate's order regarding the valuation of the Vierstra Dairy contained in the Judgment and
Amended Judgment. The District Court analyzed only the invitation to the parties to "petition the

court to address the adjustments," if necessary. Then it determined that between Susan's Motion
to Adjust and the invitation to petition the court, if necessary, there was nothing investing the

Magistrate with jurisdiction to modify the judgment. However, in analyzing Susan's Motion to
Adjust to determine whether it qualified as an I.R.C.P. 60(b) motion,2 the District Court even

observed that the Motion to Adjust "sought enforcement of the [automatic adjustment] language
contained in the Judgment." (Memorandum Opinion on Appeal, at 8, R. at 1242) (emphasis
added).
This Court has held that "[i]n the absence of an appeal from an original decree of divorce
the property divisions portions ofthat decree are final, res judicata, and no jurisdiction exists to
modify property provisions of a divorce decree." McBride v. McBride, 112 Idaho 959,961, 739
P.2d 258,260 (1987). However, this Court also recently held that "this is an entirely separate

2 In Susan's Supplemental Brief to the District Court on the jurisdictional issues raised by the Order for
Supplemental Briefing, Susan proposed that the Motion to Adjust could be interpreted as either a Rule 60(b) motion
investing the Magistrate with jurisdiction, or alternatively, as purely a motion to enforce which would require
imposition of the automatic adjustment, as contained in the Judgment and Amended Judgment, as written.
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inquiry from whether the court has jurisdiction to enforce [property provisions]." Barley v.
Smith, 149 Idaho 171,178,233 P.3d 102, 109 (2010) (emphasis in original). Indeed, this Court

noted that "[t]he McBride Court appears to indicate that a party to a property settlement
agreement that is not merged may seek court enforcement where the other party has failed to
carry out the terms ofthe agreement." Id. at n.2.
In Barley, two parties were divorced pursuant to a Judgment and Decree ofDivorce with
an attached Property Settlement Agreement. Subsequently, the wife filed a Motion to Divide an
Omitted Asset concerning the division of certain convertible notes and stock allocations awarded

to husband by virtue of his employment with United Airlines. The dispute centered on whether
such benefits were unintentionally omitted from the Property Settlement Agreement or how such
benefits should be divided under that agreement. This Court held that the Property Settlement
Agreement had not merged into the Decree and, therefore, the magistrate lacked jurisdiction to

modifY that agreement. Barley, 149 Idaho at 177,233 P.3d at 108. However, as noted
previously, the Court's inquiry did not end there.
The Court next analyzed the content ofthe wife's Motion to Divide an Omitted Asset. In
so doing, the Court held that "a mislabeled claim may be treated according to its substance." Id.
quoting Carroll v. MBNA America Bank, 148 Idaho 261, 268, 220 P.3d 1080, 1087 (2009). Even

though the wife's motion was proffered as a motion to divide an omitted asset (which would
require a modification of the property agreement), "the thrust ofthe inquiry" occasioned thereby
"was primarily directed toward interpreting the court-approved Agreement to determine whether
the assets in question were divided therein." Id. Therefore, as pertaining to the magistrate's
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jurisdiction to interpret and enforce the terms of the decree and property settlement agreement,
the Court held:
It certainly had the jurisdiction to do so under Idaho Code section 32-713, which

provides that the court, in rendering a decree of divorce, must make an
appropriate order for the disposition of the community property. The court has
the power under Idaho Code sections 1-1603 and 1-1901, to enforce its orders. In
this case, because we find that the assets in question-the convertible notes and
stock allocations-were community property at the time of the divorce and
divided pursuant to the Agreement, the magistrate court had jurisdiction to
interpret and enforce the terms of the Agreement.
Id. (emphasis added).
Just as in Borley, Susan's Motion to Adjust did not seek a modification ofthe Judgment
or Amended Judgment, but rather, it sought enforcement ofthe mandatory adjustment. This was
even observed by the District Court, however it then failed to implement the proper analysis. If
Susan were granted the relief requested by her motion, neither the Judgment nor Amended
Judgment would have changed. The relief requested by Susan had already been provided in the
Magistrate's previous orders which were both drafted by Michael's counsel-which should
foreclose any argument by Michael on appeal that the Judgment and Amended Judgment should
be construed in any way contrary to their plain language. In Borley, this Court observed that:
It should be noted that Borley was the party who drafted the Decree for the court
to sign. Thus, it seems disingenuous for Borley to now claim that the very
document she drafted is ambiguous and subject to an interpretation at odds with
the language she wrote in the Decree.

Borley, 149 Idaho at n. 1 (emphasis added).
The Judgment and Amended Judgment both provide that "the tax consequence to be
incurred by Vierstra Dairy in 2009 is as shown on Exhibit 801(a) [$1,006,000] .... Ifno tax
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consequence occurs, or if the tax consequence is different from that shown in Exhibit 801(a), the
parties shall adjust the valuations and equalizations accordingly." (Judgment, at 6,-r 9, R. at 602;

Amended Judgment, at 6,-r 9, R. at 962) (emphasis added). The term "shall" is a mandatory term.
See Mihalka v. Shepherd, 145 Idaho 547, 553, 181 P.3d 473,479 (2008). Therefore, ifthe taxes
for 2009 turned out to be different than the approximately $1,006,000 figure upon which the
magistrate relied, the parties had a mandatory obligation to adjust the valuation accordingly. The
effect of the Judgment and Amended Judgment was to require Michael to supply the valuation
deficiency to Susan as soon as the 2009 taxes were affirmatively ascertained. He did not comply
with this order and Susan was left with no option but to seek enforcement.
The facts of this case are nearly identical to the situation presented in Barley, except in

Barley the property allocation was included in the Property Settlement Agreement, whereas in
this case, the property allocation was included directly in the Judgment and Amended Judgment.
In both cases, the property in question was community property that was subject to a final
adjudication and allocation pursuant to a divorce decree. Additionally, the actual value could not
be determined until the occurrence of future events. In Barley, the husband did not earn a vested
interest in all of his convertible notes and stock options through United Airlines until after
completing a period of continued employment after the decree and Property Settlement

Agreement were entered. In this case, the Magistrate's valuation of the Vierstra Dairy could not
be ascertained until the 2009 tax liability was determined because the actual amount due in taxes
for 2009 was not known at the time of trial but was speculated by the parties. In both cases, the
spouses filed post-judgment motions to address the necessary adjustments once the future
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contingencies had been ascertained. Accordingly, just as in Barley, Susan's motion must be
treated as one seeking enforcement, not modification. The District Court correctly observed that
Susan's Motion to Adjust sought enforcement, but then failed to apply the Barley analysis and
remand for the Magistrate to implement and enforce the provisions of the Judgment and
Amended Judgment.

The irony in the Magistrate's actions, and the District Court's holding on appeal, is that
by denying Susan's motion seeking enforcement of the automatic adjustment, the Magistrate
modified the property allocation of the Judgment and Amended Judgment. The District Court
effectively blessed this modification while at the same time dismissing Susan's appeal on the
grounds that the Magistrate had no jurisdiction to modify the property allocations. The District
Court should have focused on Michael's failure to bring any motion or appellate procedure
vesting the Magistrate with jurisdiction to modify its previous order. Susan wanted the
Judgment and Amended Judgment enforced, but the Magistrate reconsidered the issue over

Susan's objection and modified its previous order sua sponte without any motion to modify
properly before it. Accordingly, the Magistrate did not have jurisdiction to modify its previous
order and should have enforced it, as written. The District Court erred by analyzing Susan's
Motion to Adjust as a motion for modification and dismissing it for lack of jurisdiction instead of

analyzing Susan's motion as one seeking enforcement, as the District Court even acknowledged,
and requiring the Magistrate to implement the automatic adjustment under the Barley analysis.
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2.

The automatic adjustment contained in the Judgment and Amended Judgment was
not erroneous.
Part of the District Court's analysis in the Memorandum Opinion on Appeal appears to

question, but not explicitly condemn, the language of the automatic adjustment and the invitation
to petition the Magistrate to address the adjustments contained in the Judgment and Amended

Judgment. After quoting this language, with emphasis on the invitation to petition the Magistrate
to address the adjustments, the District Court observed:
This language appears to contemplate a procedure for post-judgment modification
of the property division portions ofthe Judgment. It does not refer to a specific
statute, rule or case law that would authorize post-judgment property and debt
division and allocation. It is not clear whether the Magistrate contemplated a
separate procedure for the modification of the property division portions ofthe
Judgment.

(Memorandum Opinion on Appeal, at 7, R. at 1242). It is unclear to what extent, if any, this
observation factored into the District Court's holding that the "Magistrate lacked the jurisdiction
to modify the tax liability and valuation of the Vierstra Dairy." (Memorandum Opinion on

Appeal, at 9, R. at 1244). To the extent it played any role in the District Court's analysis, it was
clearly erroneous.
As noted above, the reasoning underlying the District Court's language quoted above was
based on a fundamental misconstruction of the nature of what the Magistrate had ordered and
what Susan was seeking to accomplish. The language of the Judgment and Amended Judgment
ordering an automatic adjustment and inviting the parties to petition the court, if necessary, was
not a procedure for post-judgment modification. Rather it was a procedure for post-judgment
implementation and enforcement. As discussed at length above, the automatic adjustment was
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set in stone. Nothing would have changed through Susan's motion or the Magistrate's invitation
to bring such a petition. The Judgment and Amended Judgment provide that the valuation of the
Vierstra Dairy shall be reduced by the 2009 taxes. The value ordered by the Magistrate of the
Vierstra Dairy can best be summarized as follows:
[Net Value]

=

[Gross Pre-Tax Value (as found by Magistrate)] - [actual 2009 tax liability]

At the time of the Judgment and Amended Judgment, the Magistrate believed the 2009
tax liability to be $1,006,000. However, its orders provide that regardless of what it found at that
time, the actual valuation would incorporate only the actual 2009 tax liability that came due.
That liability was later ascertained to be only $85,172, thus triggering the implementation ofthe
automatic adjustment. This automatic adjustment could then be enforced by the Magistrate
without a separate proceeding, or the necessary jurisdiction attendant to such proceeding. See
Barley, 149 Idaho at 178,233 P.3d at 109 (holding that there is no need for the parties to seek
relief in a separate action when a post-judgment motion seeks interpretation and enforcement).
Indeed, before bringing the Motion to Adjust, Susan first sought to have Michael make payment
of the amount owed to her under the adjusted calculation. It was not until it became apparent
that such payment was not forthcoming that Susan deemed it necessary to "petition the court to
address the adjustments."
Trial courts in proceedings involving the division of community property frequently
order that property be subject to future sale, refinance or other conditions upon the occurrence of
future events, or sometimes even without any future requirements attached. See, e.g., Devine v.
Cluff, 111 Idaho 476, 725 P .2d 181 (et. App. 1986) (analyzing, in part, the effect of a provision

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

- 22-

contained in a judgment causing automatic forfeiture of a property easement based on a party's
failure to obtain a survey within six months of the judgment). Additionally, the issues in Barley
revolved around the division of assets that were contingent at the time the decree and Property
Settlement Agreement were entered. Once the husband's vested interest in those assets was

ascertained post-judgment, this Court ultimately determined that those assets that were
specifically included in the Property Settlement Agreement's equal division between the spouses
(the convertible notes) should be valued and divided according to that agreement. See Barley,
149 Idaho at 187,233 P.3d at 118.
Even in the present case, the actual value of the Vierstra Dairy was not the only provision
relative to that item of community property that was left to future contingencies. Neither the
Judgment nor the Amended Judgment explicitly provided who would be awarded the Vierstra

Dairy or what the exact value would be. However, fixed procedures were put in place to
determine both the identity of the purchaser and the price. Susan was given the first right of
refusal. If she did not exercise that right, a procedure was put into place whereby Michael could
purchase the Dairy. Ifhe did not exercise that right, it would be sold to a third party. Just as the
identity of the purchaser was not expressly ordered, but rather fixed to the occurrence or
nonoccurrence of certain events, the price was also fixed at the amount found by the court
subject to the determination ofthe actual value of the 2009 taxes. Ifthe 2009 tax liability were
$2,000,000, Michael might have argued that Susan owed him her share of that liability.
Likewise, as is the case, if the tax turned out to be only $85,000, Michael owes Susan half of the
difference. No modification was necessary in order for those procedures to take effect. The
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valuation and distribution of the Vierstra Dairy was fixed as of the date of the Amended
Judgment and neither party sought a modification of those provisions.

Accordingly, the District Court erred by construing the Magistrate's orders and Susan's
Motion to Adjust as inviting modification of the property valuation and allocation, even while

acknowledging that Susan's motion merely sought enforcement. Because the property valuation
and allocation concerning the Vierstra Dairy was fixed, the Magistrate had jurisdiction to
implement and enforce the automatic adjustment contained in its prior orders. The District
Court's holding that the Magistrate lacked jurisdiction to entertain Susan's motion seeking
enforcement of the Judgment and Amended Judgment was erroneous.
C.

Whether the District Court erred by dismissing the appeal from the Amended
Judgment entered on April 29, 2010 for lack of jurisdiction?
Susan timely appealed from the Amended Judgment arguing that the Magistrate erred by

including a speculative tax liability in its valuation of the Vierstra Dairy that was not immediate
and specific. The District Court dismissed Susan's appeal of this issue holding that it lacked
jurisdiction to consider the appeal because Susan failed to timely appeal this issue from the
Judgment. In doing so, the District Court held that none of the intervening motions by the

parties tolled the time period for filing a notice of appeal. Because the tax liability portion of the
Judgment remained unchanged in the Amended Judgment, the District Court held that the 42-day

time period for filing a notice of appeal of that issue ran from the entry of the Judgment. The
District Court's dismissal of Susan's appeal of this issue was erroneous.
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The District Court had jurisdiction to consider the erroneous inclusion of the speculative
tax liability in the valuation of the Vierstra Dairy contained in the Judgment and subsequently in
the Amended Judgment. If the Judgment was a final order in the case, then according to LA.R.
14(a), the time for filing a notice of appeal terminated upon the timely filing of the Plaintiff's
Objection and began to run anew from the entry of the order resolving the issues raised by the
Plaintiff's Objection. That order was the Amended Judgment. Accordingly, Susan timely
appealed the issue ofthe speculative tax liability from the Amended Judgment.
Alternatively, ifthe Judgment was not final because it provided for automatic adjustment
of the valuation if the 2009 taxes varied from the amount of$I,006,000, then the Order re: Post
Trial Motions, with its refusal to adjust the valuation and equalization payment after the 2009
taxes turned out to be only $85,000, served as the operative order that finally adjudicated the
parties' claims for relief requested by the pleadings. Accordingly, if the Judgment was not final,
Susan has also timely appealed the tax issue from the Order re: Post Trial Motions.
Furthermore, no individual issues were certified as final in the Judgment. Accordingly,
the Judgment as a whole can only be considered a final judgment if it resolved all of Susan and
Michael's claims for relief. Idaho Appellate Rule 11 allows for an appeal as a matter of right
from final judgments, as defined by LR.C.P. 54(a). Rule 54(a) defines "Judgment" as:
[AJ separate document entitled Judgment or Decree. A judgment shall state the
relief to which a party is entitled on one or more claims for relief in the action.
Such relief can include dismissal with or without prejudice. A judgment shall not
contain a recital of pleadings, the report of a master, the record of prior
proceedings, courts legal reasoning, findings of fact, or conclusions oflaw. A
judgment is final if either it has been certified as final pursuant to subsection
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(b)(1) of this rule or judgment has been entered on all claims for relief, except
costs and fees, asserted by or against all parties in the action.
(Emphasis added). "Until all claims for relief in this lawsuit have been resolved by entry of a
judgment, there is no final judgment." Harrison v. Certain Underwriters at Lloyd's, London,
149 Idaho 201, 206, 233 P.3d 132, 137 (2010) citing In re Universe Life Ins. Co., 144 Idaho 751,
755, 171 P.3d 242, 246 (2007); Piske v. Freeman, 143 Idaho 832, 833, 153 P.3d 1178, 1179
(2007); LR.C.P. 54(b). "The judgment sought is a final determination of a claim or claims for
relief in the lawsuit." Spokane Structures, Inc. v. Equitable Investment, L.L.c., 148 Idaho 616,
619,226 P.3d 1263, 1266 (2010).
The claims relevant to the property distribution raised by the pleadings were (1) "[t]hat
the Court equitably divide the community property and debts," (Complaint for Divorce, at 6, R.
at 22); and (2) "[t]he net community estate after considering taxes should be equally divided,"

(Answer to Complaint and Counterclaim, at 3, R. at 35). Concerning the tax liability, the
Judgment provided:
The court finds the tax consequence to be incurred by Vierstra Dairy in 2009 is as
is shown on Exhibit 801(A) [$1,006,000]. The Court finds that it is more likely
than not that Vierstra Dairy will incur the tax consequence. The party who
receives the dairy will timely pay said taxes to the State of Idaho and the Internal
Revenue Service. If no tax consequence occurs, or if the tax consequence is
different from that shown in Exhibit 801ea), the parties shall adjust the valuations
and equalizations accordingly. If necessary, the parties can petition the court to
address the adjustments. The court orders the parties to timely file tax returns and
other filings concerning the Vierstra Dairy.
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Id. at,-r 9 (emphasis added). Regardless of whether the above-described language contained in
the Judgment (as drafted by Michael's counsel) was or was not a final judgment, the District
Court had jurisdiction to consider Susan's appeal.
1.

If the Judgment was final, I.A.R. 14 provides that the Plaintiff's Objection (filed
February 8, 2010) extended the appeal deadline for 42 days following the entry of
the Amended Judgment (entered on April 29, 2010) that resolved the Plaintiff's
Objection.

One manner to extend the time for filing an appeal following a final judgment is to file a
timely objection or motion following the entry of the decree. Idaho Appellate Rule 14(a)
provides, in relevant part:
The time for an appeal from any civil judgment or order in an action is terminated
by the filing of a timely motion which, if granted, could affect any findings of
fact, conclusions oflaw or any judgment in the action ... in which case the
appeal period for all judgments or orders commences to run upon the date of the
clerk's filing stamp on the order deciding such motion.
(Emphasis added).
The Idaho Court of Appeals has considered the effect that objections to a judgment have
on the time for filing a notice of appeal. The Court has held:
The district court's judgment awarding damages in this case was filed on October
1, 1997. Both parties filed motions objecting to portions of the judgment. These
motions did extend the time to appeal from the October 1, 1997 judgment because
they could have "affect[ed] ... findings of fact, conclusions oflaw or ... [the]
judgment in the action." LA.R. 14(a). The district court issued an order on
November 4, 1997, denying these motions. As of that date no further motions
were pending that could affect the damage award. The time to appeal from the
judgment for damages therefore began to run on November 4, 1997.
Walton, Inc. v. Jensen, 132 Idaho 716, 719, 979 P.2d 118, 121 (Ct. App. 1999). In such cases,

the 42-day period for filing a notice of appeal is terminated upon filing of an objection to a
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judgment and begins to run anew, upon the issuance of an order resolving the motion. See Floyd
v. Bd. ofComm'rs ofBonneville County, Idaho, 137 Idaho 718, 52 P.3d 863, (2002). See also E.
Idaho Health Servs. v. Burtenshaw, 122 Idaho 904, 841 P.2d 434 (1992) overruled on other
grounds by Floyd v. Bd. ofComm'rs ofBonneville County, Idaho, 137 Idaho 718, 52 P.3d 863
(2002); Thompson v. Pike, 122 Idaho 690,838 P.2d 293 (1992); Sinclair Mktg. v. Siepert, 107

Idaho 1000, 1006,695 P.2d 385, 391 (1985) ("The time before the post-judgment motion does
not accumulate with the time after disposition. Rather, the time commences anew after the
disposition of the timely post-judgment motion.").
In Cecil v. Gagnebin, 146 Idaho 714, 202 P.3d 1 (2009), the Idaho Supreme Court
directly addressed the application of LA.R. 14(a) to the time for filing a notice of appeal from a
final judgment. In that case, a judgment was entered on March 8, 2007, based upon a stipulated
settlement between the parties. When the trial court discovered that one of the parties had not
signed the stipulation, it later granted summary judgment to Cecil and entered an amended
judgment to that effect on April 30, 2007. On May 8, 2007, Cecil filed a motion to correct the
amended judgment based on an incorrect boundary line description. On May 14, 2007, the trial
court entered an order granting costs and attorney's fees to Cecil. Then, on June 12,2007, the
trial court entered its second amended judgment correcting the boundary line description.
Gagnebin filed a notice of appeal on July 20,2007.
One of the issues on appeal in Cecil concerned whether the Supreme Court had
jurisdiction to consider Gagnebin's appeal from the award of costs and attorney's fees to Cecil
since Gagnebin's notice of appeal was filed 67 days after the entry of that order. The Idaho
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Supreme Court held that it did have jurisdiction to consider the issue. The Court reasoned that
according to LA.R. 14(a), the filing of the Motion to Amend the Amended Judgment on May 8,
2007, "terminated the running of the time for appeal, and it did not begin to run until the order
deciding the motion was filed. The motion was decided by the district court when it filed the
second amended judgment on June 12,2007." Cecil, 146 Idaho at 719, 202 P.3d at 6.
According to the Cecil decision and the plain language ofLA.R. 14(a), there is no
reguirement that the intervening motion or objection be related to any specific finding of fact,
conclusion oflaw, or judgment that is ultimately appealed. Rather, the plain language of the
rule, as supported by applicable case law, provides that the 42-day time period for filing a notice
of appeal from a final judgment is terminated, and not simply paused, by "the filing of.§: timely
motion which, if granted, could affect any findings of fact, conclusions of law or any judgment
in the action." LA.R. 14(a) (emphasis added).
This analysis is in harmony and clearly distinguishable from State v. Payan, 128 Idaho
866,920 P.2d 82 (Ct. App. 1996), cited in the District Court's Memorandum Opinion on Appeal.
In Payan, there was no relevant, timely motion or objection filed that invoked LA.R. 14(a).
Several months after entry of the judgment, the district court entered an amended judgment
which added a provision granting Payan credit for time served. Payan argued that his untimely
appeal from the judgment was made timely by the subsequent entry of the amended judgment.
The Court of Appeals held that the mere issuance of an amended judgment, with nothing more,
and "which did not alter any of the terms from which Payan now appeals, did not serve to extend
the period for filing an appeal or begin that period anew." Id. at 868, 920 P.2d at 84. However,
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the Court acknowledged that ifPayan had filed a timely LC.R. 35 motion for a reduction of
sentence, he could have extended the time for filing an appeal pursuant to LA.R. 14. See also
State v. Ciccone, 150 Idaho 305, 308, 246 P.3d 958, 961 (2010) citing LA.R. 14(a) (emphasis

added) ("Similarly, a party's motion capable of affecting the judgment may extend the 42-day
period, but only if such motion is filed within 14 days of the judgment.").
In this case, on February 8, 2010, the fourteenth (14th) day following the entry ofthe
Judgment, Susan timely filed the Plaintiff's Objection (R. at 728), which was later supported by

a Memorandum in Support, filed March 25, 2010. (R. at 889). The Memorandum in Support
provided (1) objections to various factual findings in the Judgment; (2) objections to various
redundant and unnecessary references to prior orders; (3) objections to the inclusion of various
one-sided statements from the Magistrate's Memorandum Decision; (4) an objection to the
excessive length ofthe Judgment; and (5) a request to quash the Judgment in its entirety and
request that it be replaced in its entirety with a proposed replacement Judgment and Decree of
Divorce, attached to the Memorandum in Support, to be entered nunc pro tunc. A hearing was

held on Plaintiff's Objection on April 27, 2010, after which the Amended Judgment was entered
on April 29, 2010 in conformance with the Court's decision on Plaintiff's Objection.
The Plaintiff's Objection and the Memorandum in Support clearly implicate the
provisions of LA.R. 14(a). The lengthy list of objections to various facts contained in the
Judgment, together with the objections to the form of the Judgment and the request to quash the
Judgment and replace it in its entirety, if granted, would have affected "any findings offact,

conclusions of law or any judgment in the action." LA.R. 14(a) (emphasis added). The District
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Court's Memorandum Opinion on Appeal appears to hold that a Rule 59(e) motion must seek to
"correct legal and factual errors occurring in proceedings before it." (Memorandum Opinion on

Appeal, at 4, R. at 1239). The District Court bases its analysis on the case of Straub v. Smith,
145 Idaho 65, 71, 175 P.3d 754, 760 (2007), in which this Court notes that Rule 59(e) can be
used to correct legal and factual errors. According to the District Court, because the Plaintiff's

Objection did not sufficiently highlight specific factual or legal errors, it could not be construed
as a motion to alter or amend the judgment which would terminate the time for filing a notice of
appeal. This holding was erroneous.
The Plaintiff's Objection raised several issues with factual findings contained in the

Judgment and, notably, requested to quash the Judgment in its entirety. At that point, the status
of the Judgment itself was in question. Any appeal at that point, of any issue, would have been
premature until the operative final order in the case was issued and the time for altering or
amending that order had run. This is precisely the value behind LA.R. 14(a). It allows all
uncertainty regarding the form and substance of the final order to settle prior to the running of
the time for filing a notice of appeal. At the time ofthe Plaintiff's Objection, neither party knew
exactly what the final order would look like. The fact that little ultimately changed in the

Amended Judgment, which was entered after a contested hearing on the matter, is oflittle
consequence. The time for filing an appeal was, therefore, terminated until that objection was
resolved by a file-stamped order. A hearing was held on the Plaintiff's Objection, and the order
that followed from that hearing was the Amended Judgment. Thus, Susan's timely Notice of
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Appeal from the Amended Judgment is effective as to all the findings, conclusions, and
judgments contained therein.
Additionally, the District Court confused the rules regarding termination of the time for
filing a notice of appeal in the criminal versus the civil context. The District Court held that "[i]f
an amended judgment is entered that does not change a particular disposition in an original
judgment, the time for appeal on that disposition [sic] issue begins on the date ofthe original
judgment." (Memorandum Opinion on Appeal, at 5, R. at 1240). In support of this proposition
the District Court cited to Payan and Ciccone-two criminal cases. These cases are
distinguishable from this case, however, because of differences in the criminal and civil rules.
Pursuant to the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure, various post-trial motions can be brought that
stop the time for appeal including a motion to reconsider under Rule 11, a motion for a new trial
under Rule 59(a), or a motion to alter or amend a judgment under Rule 59( e). The criminal rules
do not provide the same post-trial motions that toll the time for appeal as in civil cases except for
LC.R. 35 (which the appellate court in Payan specifically noted was not filed within the 14 day
period required to toll the time for appeal). In Ciccone, this Court even noted that "a party's
motion capable of affecting the judgment may extend the 42-day period, but only if such motion
is filed within 14 days of the judgment." Ciccone, 150 Idaho at 308, 246 P.3d at 958. The

Plaintiff's Objection that was filed in this case was styled as a motion to alter or amend the
judgment under Rule 59(e) and which was filed within the applicable 14 day time period. As
such, the time for appeal was tolled until the entry of the Amended Judgment.
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2.

If the Judgment was a imal order, Susan may still appeal directly from any post-

trial order.
Both the Judgment and the Amended Judgment provide for a mandatory adjustment in the
valuation of the Vierstra Dairy ifthe 2009 taxes turned out to be different than $1,006,000. After
the 2009 taxes were determined to be less than one-tenth of that amount, Susan moved to make
the adjustment. What resulted was the Order re: Post Trial Motions. An appeal as a matter of
right may be taken from "any order made after final judgment." LA.R. 11(a)(7) (emphasis
added). See also Callaghan v. Callaghan, 142 Idaho 185, 191, 125 P.3d 1061, 1067 (2005)
("The contempt order in this case was made after entry of the final judgment in the case. It was
therefore clearly appealable as a final order .... "). As noted in Section A above, the District
Court acknowledged that it had jurisdiction to consider Susan's appeal from the Order Re: Post

Trial Motions as pertaining to her appeal from the denial of her Motion to Adjust. However, the
District Court erred by not considering Susan's appeal ofthe speculative tax issue through that
order as well.
By the Order Re: Post Trial Motions, the Magistrate refused to make the adjustment
required by the Judgment and Amended Judgment. Instead the order erroneously found that the
$1,006,000 speculative tax would "more likely than not" occur rather than applying the law and
finding the immediate and specific actual tax liability for 2009. Accordingly, as noted
previously, the Judgment and Amended Judgment were effectively modified by the Magistrate's
denial of Susan's Motion to Adjust. The inclusion of the speculative tax amounts fully ripened
when the Magistrate changed its stance from the tax coming due in 2009 (as contained in the
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Judgment and Amended Judgment) to the tax possibly coming due in the next three years. That
is an entirely different issue that, by itself, can give rise to Susan's appeal of the tax issue. There
was no speculation in the Magistrate's order that the value ofthe Vierstra Dairy be reduced by
the actual 2009 taxes. Speculation was introduced into the Magistrate's analysis when it shifted
from a $1,006,000 tax liability in 2009, or whatever the actual 2009 tax liability turned out to be,
to a $1,006,000 tax liability due sometime over the next several years. The Magistrate was not
presented with a motion to modify the Judgment or Amended Judgment justifying such a
deviation and it did not have substantial and competent evidence for its conclusions, but altered
its previous orders, at least in part, due to a concern for Michael to continue his refinancing.
From that erroneous reasoning, Susan can appeal the inclusion of a speculative tax into the
valuation of the Vierstra Dairy that is neither immediate and specific nor supported by
substantial and competent evidence.
Additionally, prior to the Order re: Post Trial Motions, there was nothing for Susan to
appeal. Any erroneous analysis contained in the Judgment or Amended Judgment had been
mitigated by the automatic adjustment. Susan knew the tax would not approach the $1,006,000
figure based on the Vierstra Dairy's tax history and that the issue would resolve itself. Susan
abided by the Judgment and Amended Judgment and sought the automatic adjustment to the
dairy valuation based on the correct 2009 tax liability. Her request to enforce the Judgment and

Amended Judgment was denied. The fact is, the Order re: Post Trial Motions finally adjudicated
the rights of the parties relating to their claims of relief requested in the initial pleadings. Susan
had not suffered any loss until this substantive and erroneous adjudication deprived her of nearly
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$500,000 of her rightful share of community property. Susan may appeal, as of right, from the
order causing that deprivation as it relates specifically to the expanded inclusion of the
speculative tax liability. Accordingly, the District Court erred by dismissing her appeal ofthis
issue from the Order Re: Post Trial Motions.

3.

If the Judgment was not a final order, then the Order re: Post Trial Motions, from
which Susan appealed within 42 days, served as the final adjudication of the
parties' claims.

Ifthe above-referenced portions of the Judgment did not serve as a final determination of
the parties' claims, then "the forty-two day period to file a notice of appeal begins to run once an
order is entered that resolves all issues, grants all relief to which the prevailing party is entitled
other than attorney fees and costs, and brings an end to a lawsuit." Goodman Oil Co. v. Scotty's
Duro-Bilt Generator, Inc., 148 Idaho 588, 591, 226 P.3d 530, 533 (2010) (emphasis added). In
this case, if the Judgment was not final, then the order that ended the lawsuit and finally
adjudicated the parties rights respecting the dairy operation and the effect of any speculative tax
amounts was the Order re: Post Trial Motions entered May 18,2010. That order did not allow
for alterations or adjustments in the future. It unequivocally provided for the valuation and
distribution of the property with finality, thereby ending any issues regarding the purchase right
and the inclusion ofthe speculative tax in the valuation of the dairy. Thus, the District Court had
jurisdiction to review the Magistrate's erroneous inclusion of the speculative tax liability in its
valuation of the Vierstra Dairy through Susan's timely appeal ofthe Order re: Post Trial
Motions, because it was clearly filed within 42 days of that order.
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VI.
COSTS AND ATTORNEY'S FEES ON APPEAL

Susan requests her costs incurred in filing this appeal pursuant to Idaho law, including
I.A.R. 40, and all reasonable attorney's fees incurred in pursuing this appeal pursuant to Idaho
law, including I.A.R. 41 and I.C. § 12-121. Attorney fees under I.C. § 12-121 are appropriate if
an appeal has been brought or defended frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation. See
Crowley v. Critchfield, 145 Idaho 509, 514, 181 P.3d 435,440 (2007). In this case, Susan has

sought enforcement of the Judgment and Amended Judgment as prepared by Michael. The plain
language ofthose orders provides that Susan is entitled to the relief she has requested and
provides that Michael should have provided the deficiency on his own accord upon the filling of
the 2009 tax returns. He refused to abide by that order, which unreasonable refusal has caused
enormous expense on Susan's part to seek implementation and enforcement ofthe Magistrate's
orders. Such continued judicial intervention would have been unnecessary had Michael
originally complied with the order. His actions leading to the filing of Susan's Motion to Adjust
and the subsequent filing of this appeal, as well as his defense of this appeal have been frivolous,
unreasonable or without foundation. Accordingly, should this Court determine that Susan is the
prevailing party on appeal, Susan respectfully requests that this Court award her costs and
attorney's fees incurred herewith.
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VII.
CONCLUSION

The District Court erred by dismissing Susan's appeal from the Magistrate's denial of her
Motion to Adjust on the grounds that the Magistrate lacked jurisdiction to consider any

modification. The District Court misconstrued Susan's motion and the Magistrate's invitation
for the parties to petition the court to address the adjustments, ifnecessarY,as contemplating
post-judgment modification. To the contrary, the automatic adjustment and Susan's Motion to
Adjust contemplated implementation and enforcement of a final order valuing and dividing a

community property asset. The District Court acknowledged that Susan's Motion to Adjust
sought enforcement, but dismissed on jurisdictional grounds contrary to this Court's holding in
Barley. Accordingly, Susan requests that this Court remand to the District Court with

instructions to enter an order requiring the Magistrate to enforce the automatic adjustment
contained in the Judgment and Amended Judgment.
The District Court also erred by dismissing Susan's appeal of the speculative tax issue
from the Amended Judgment and the Order Re: Post Trial Motions. If the Judgment was final,
the District Court had jurisdiction to consider Susan's appeal either (1) because the filing of the
Plaintiff's Objection terminated the time for filing a notice of appeal until the entry ofthe
Amended Judgment pursuant to LA.R. 14(a); or (2) because the Order Re: Post Trial Motions

and the Magistrate's refusal to enforce the Judgment and Amended Judgment modified those
orders, allowing Susan to appeal the speculative tax issue as of right from the Order Re: Post
Trial Motions pursuant to LA.R. 11 (a)(7). If the Judgment was not final, then the Order re:
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Post Trial Motions served to finally adjudicate the parties' claims contained in the pleadings. In

which case, Susan's appeal was timely. In any event, the District Court erred by dismissing
Susan's appeal from the tax issue for lack of jurisdiction. Susan respectfully requests that this
Court remand to the District Court with instructions to consider Susan's issue that the
Magistrate's finding of a $1,006,000 tax liability over the next several years was too speculative
to be considered in the valuation of the Vierstra Dairy.
Oral argument is requested.
DATED this 5th day of December, 2011.

WRIGHT BROTHERS LAW OFFICE, PLLC

4t3~,~~
Lisa B. Rodriguez
.
Attorney for Appellant Susan Vierstra
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